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Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx. By BENEDETTO CROCE. Translated by C. M. Meredith, with an introduction by A. D. Lindsay. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1914. Pp. xxiii, 188. Price, \$1.25.

"The Essays in this volume . . . have all of them had an occasional origin. They bear evident traces of particular controversy. . . . Their author thought it worth while to collect them in one volume . . . [as] an attempt to make clear by philosophical criticism the real purpose and value of Marx' work." The book has the interest that attaches to controversial writing, as well as a certain constructive value.

The Great Problems. By BERNARDINO VARISCO. Translated by R. C. LODGE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1914. Pp. xi, 370. Price, \$2.75.

A volume in Muirhead's *Library of Philosophy*. *I massimi problemi* appeared in 1910, and the present translation is made from the M.S. of the second Italian edition. There are eight chapters (Search after Truth; Sense-perception; Memory, Feeling, Action; Cognition; Values; Reality and Reason; Being; Conclusion) and seven appendices (General Considerations: Theory of Knowledge; Limitations of Intelligence; Truth and Knowledge; Metaphysics and Morality; Thought and Reality; Immanence and Transcendence). The final result reached is that "things and facts are ultimately determinate forms of one self-identical Being, which coincides with our concept of Being." The chapters entitled Sense-perception, etc., are epistemological and not psychological; the appendices are for the most part controversial in character.

The Problem of Individuality: A Course of Four Lectures delivered Before the University of London in October, 1913. By HANS DRIESCH. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1914. Pp. ix, 84. Price, \$1.00.

The first lecture deals with the general topics of mechanism and vitalism, and formulates the first argument for vitalism, that derived from the harmonious-equipotential system. The second lecture formulates the second and third arguments, those from the origin of the complex-equipotential systems and from human action; introduces the concept of the non-mechanical entelechy; and characterizes the entelechy negatively as non-energetic (the vital principle is not energy, does not create energy, does not in Cartesian fashion deflect energy), positively as exhibiting a suspensory or relaxing function. The third lecture takes up the logic of vitalism; distinguishes between singular, creative (thing-creative or movement-creative), and unifying causality; and decides that the concepts of wholeness and of unifying causality are fundamental. Even on Kantian lines a legitimation of the concept of wholeness is possible. The question of a suprapersonal entelechy, realising itself in space in the phylogenetic process, cannot be answered outright in the affirmative, by reason of the contingency apparent in every historical and political formation; but various facts, the moral consciousness in particular, attest it. The fourth and last lecture enquires whether vitalism may pass from dualism (singular and unifying causality, organic and inorganic Nature, contingency and order) to a monism of order. "Personally," says the author,

"I confess that . . . I myself feel forced to accept the *dualistic* doctrine, in spite of all logical postulates." As regards the bearing of vitalism upon metaphysical questions, two points are noted: the Spinozistic dogma is contravened, since Nature cannot be entirely comprehended under spatial symbolism; and the postulation of en-telechial predetermination may be taken either simply to mark the limits of our understanding, or to limit freedom of becoming: "the ultimate problem of the philosophy of wholeness is a matter of belief."

This is a rough account of the contents of the book,—which is useful, as summarising Driesch's conclusions in various fields of scientific and speculative activity, but which, just because it is such a summary, is far from easy reading. A minor feature that may be worth mentioning is the author's addition of foot-notes which bring his own ideas into relation with those of contemporary English thinkers.